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![Studia Neoaristotelica](title.png)
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PUTNAM’S REALISMS AND CONCEPTUAL RELATIVITY
Tomáš Marvan
SUMMARIUM
Realismi Putnamii et relativitas conceptuum
Disserationis huius scopus duplex est. Primo, doctrinam de „relativitate conceptuum“ a praeclaro philosopho clarissimo Hilario Putnamio nonnullis in contextibus propositam, exponere, modumque, quo haec doctrina, secundum Putnamium, fundamenta realismi metaphysici (prout in dissertatione nostra definitur) labefactet, indicare. Secundo, examinatio argu¬menti Putnamii contra realismum metaphysicum proponitur. Auctor Putnamium nihil nisi exempla „relativitatis indexicalis“, quam vocant, praebere abitratur. Hanc vero relativitatem, ut a omnibus concessam, nullam hic probandi vim habere per se patet. Argumenta igitur Putnamii fundamenta realismi metaphysici conquasare minime videntur.
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SUMMARY
Putnam’s Realisms and Conceptual Relativity
The aim of the paper is twofold. First, it expounds the thesis of ‘conceptual relativity’ propounded in a series of writings of the well-known philosopher Hilary Putnam and indicates the alleged manner in which the thesis, according to Putnam, undermines the foundations of metaphysical realism (understood in a peculiar way spelled out in the paper). Second, a critical examination of Putnam’s anti-metaphysical-realist argument is offered. It is argued that Putnam offers examples only of a trivial, so-called indexical relativity, and that his strategy leaves the foundations of metaphysical realism intact.
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